Mind to move: Differences in running biomechanics between sensing and intuition shod runners.

Delving into the complexities of embodied cognition unveils the intertwined influence of mind, body, and environment. The connection of physical activity with cognition sparks a hypothesis linking motion and personality traits. Hence, this study explored whether personality traits could be linked to biomechanical variables characterizing running forms. To do so, 80 runners completed three randomized 50-m running-trials at 3.3, 4.2, and 5m/s during which their running biomechanics [ground contact time (tc), flight time (tf), duty factor (DF), step frequency (SF), leg stiffness (kleg), maximal vertical ground reaction force (Fmax), and maximal leg compression of the spring during stance (ΔL)] was evaluated. In addition, participants' personality traits were assessed through the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) test. The MBTI classifies personality traits into one of two possible categories along four axes: extraversion-introversion; sensing-intuition; thinking-feeling; and judging-perceiving. This exploratory study offers compelling evidence that personality traits, specifically sensing and intuition, are associated with distinct running biomechanics. Individuals classified as sensing demonstrated a more grounded running style characterized by prolonged tc, shorter tf, higher DF, and greater ΔL compared to intuition individuals (p≤0.02). Conversely, intuition runners exhibited a more dynamic and elastic running style with a shorter tc and higher kleg than their sensing counterparts (p≤0.02). Post-hoc tests revealed a significant difference in tc between intuition and sensing runners at all speeds (p≤0.02). According to the definition of each category provided by the MBTI, sensing individuals tend to focus on concrete facts and physical realities while intuition individuals emphasize abstract concepts and patterns of information. These results suggest that runners with sensing and intuition personality traits differ in their ability to use their lower limb structures as springs. Intuition runners appeared to rely more in the stretch-shortening cycle to energetically optimize their running style while sensing runners seemed to optimize running economy by promoting more forward progression than vertical oscillations. This study underscores the intriguing interplay between personality traits of individuals and their preferred movement patterns.

Heuristic strategy of intuitive statistical inferences in 7- to 10-year-old children.

Intuitive statistical inferences refer to making inferences about uncertain events based on limited probabilistic information, which is crucial for both human and non-human species' survival and reproduction. Previous research found that 7- and 8-year-old children failed in intuitive statistical inference tasks after heuristic strategies had been controlled. However, few studies systematically explored children's heuristic strategies of intuitive statistical inferences and their potential numerical underpinnings. In the current research, Experiment 1 (N = 81) examined 7- to 10-year-olds' use of different types of heuristic strategies; results revealed that children relied more on focusing on the absolute number strategy. Experiment 2 (N = 99) and Experiment 3 (N = 94) added continuous-format stimuli to examine whether 7- and 8-year-olds could make genuine intuitive statistical inferences instead of heuristics. Results revealed that both 7- and 8-year-olds and 9- and 10-year-olds performed better in intuitive statistical inference tasks with continuous-format stimuli, even after focusing on the absolute number strategy had been controlled. The results across the three experiments preliminarily hinted that the ratio processing system might rely on the approximate number system. Future research could clarify what specific numerical processing mechanism may be used and how it might support children's statistical intuitions.

Intuition and we-ness in Bion and post-Bionian field theory.

"Intuition" is probably the most frequently used term in all Bion's writings. However, in order to understand its role in his thought it is essential to give it the clearest possible definition. The thesis of this article is that by intuition Bion means a "specific" psychoanalytic concept. It is thus possible to extract intuition from the vague and mystifying reading of it by some authors, whic runs the risk of falling into an empty "intuitionism". For Bion, intuition is a psychoanalytic function of the analyst, the principal factors of which are the various expressions of dream-thought and insight. Furthermore, within the frame of the post-Bionian theory of the analytic field, the author suggests adding to these factors the use of the "we" vertex (or we-ness), i.e. to regard virtually every fact of analysis as co-created. The aim is to make the very concept of "field" more accessible. Compared with the metaphor of the analytic field, the concept of we-ness has both greater clinical versatility and greater pregnancy on the metapsychological plane. Indeed, it more directly reflects a radically social conception of human subjectivity: what is known in contemporary speculative thought - in J-L. Nancy, for example - as the "ontology of we".

Adults' learning of complex explanations violates their intuitions about optimal explanatory order.

Should you first teach about the purpose of a microwave or about how it heats food? Adults strongly prefer explanations to present function before mechanism and information about a whole to precede information about its component parts. Here we replicate those preferences (Study 1). Using the same stimuli, we then ask whether those pedagogical preferences reflect ease of learning of labels, function, or mechanism. Surprisingly, explanations that accord with function-before-mechanism and whole-before-part structure show no learning benefits to participants compared to other participants who see lessons that violate one or both intuitions (Study 2). Even when potential scaffolds are removed (i.e., diagrams) the preferred pedagogical order does not predict better learning (Study 3). Finally, explanatory order has only modest effects on experiential outcomes (e.g., curiosity, frustration; Study 4). In all cases, all orders of presentation support learning in comparison to controls and are not constrained by either ceiling or floor effects. Reasons for the clash between intuitions about learning and actual outcomes are explored.

Predictivism and avoidance of ad hoc-ness: An empirical study.

Predictivism is the thesis that evidence successfully predicted by a scientific theory counts more (or ought to count more) in the confirmation of that theory than already known evidence would. One rationale that has been proposed for predictivism is that predictive success guards against ad hoc hypotheses. Despite the intuitive attraction of predictivism, there is historical evidence that speaks against it. As valuable as the historical evidence may be, however, it is largely indirect evidence for the epistemic attitudes of individual - albeit prominent - scientists. This paper presents the results of an empirical study of scientists' attitudes toward predictivism and ad hoc-ness (n = 492), which will put the debate on a more robust empirical footing. The paper also draws attention to a tension between the ad hoc-ness avoidance rationale of predictivism and the ways philosophers have spelled out the notion of ad hoc-ness.

When intuitive Bayesians need to be good readers: The problem-wording effect on Bayesian reasoning.

Are humans intuitive Bayesians? It depends. People seem to be Bayesians when updating probabilities from experience but not when acquiring probabilities from descriptions (i.e., Bayesian textbook problems). Decades of research on textbook problems have focused on how the format of the statistical information (e.g., the natural frequency effect) affects such reasoning. However, it pays much less attention to the wording of these problems. Mathematical problem-solving literature indicates that wording is critical for performance. Wording effects (the wording varied across the problems and manipulations) can also have far-reaching consequences. These may have confounded between-format comparisons and moderated within-format variability in prior research. Therefore, across seven experiments (N = 4909), we investigated the impact of the wording of medical screening problems and statistical formats on Bayesian reasoning in a general adult population. Participants generated more Bayesian answers with natural frequencies than with single-event probabilities, but only with the improved wording. The improved wording of the natural frequencies consistently led to more Bayesian answers than the natural frequencies with standard wording. The improved wording effect occurred mainly due to a more efficient description of the statistical information-cueing required mathematical operations, an unambiguous association of numbers with their reference class and verbal simplification. The wording effect extends the current theoretical explanations of Bayesian reasoning and bears methodological and practical implications. Ultimately, even intuitive Bayesians must be good readers when solving Bayesian textbook problems.

Denoising diffusion probabilistic models for generation of realistic fully-annotated microscopy image datasets.

Recent advances in computer vision have led to significant progress in the generation of realistic image data, with denoising diffusion probabilistic models proving to be a particularly effective method. In this study, we demonstrate that diffusion models can effectively generate fully-annotated microscopy image data sets through an unsupervised and intuitive approach, using rough sketches of desired structures as the starting point. The proposed pipeline helps to reduce the reliance on manual annotations when training deep learning-based segmentation approaches and enables the segmentation of diverse datasets without the need for human annotations. We demonstrate that segmentation models trained with a small set of synthetic image data reach accuracy levels comparable to those of generalist models trained with a large and diverse collection of manually annotated image data, thereby offering a streamlined and specialized application of segmentation models.

Psychometric network analysis of the Intuitive Eating Scale-2 in Chinese general adults.

The Intuitive Eating Scale-2 (IES-2) is a measure of intuitive eating behaviors that has been extensively validated, with traditional latent variable modeling approaches, in youth and adults from many different populations, including college students in China. However, there is still a lack of research on the psychometric properties of the IES-2 in adults from the Chinese general population. Moreover, psychometric network analysis, as a complement to traditional latent variable modeling approaches, has not been used for examining the psychometric properties of the IES-2. Thus, the present study used a psychometric network approach to evaluate the psychometric properties of the IES-2 in Chinese adults from the general population. A sample of 700 Chinese general adults (50% women; Mage = 31.13 years, SD = 9.19) recruited online were included in the present study. Psychometric network analysis was performed. Exploratory graph analysis (EGA) identified four dimensions, which were well separated in the estimated network. The network structure showed excellent stability and metric measurement invariance (i.e., network loadings) across men and women. Furthermore, several items on the IES-2 were identified as key nodes in the network of the IES-2 that may be important for the development and maintenance of intuitive eating. For example, two items (i.e., "I trust my body to tell me when to eat," and "I trust my body to tell me when to stop eating") related to reliance on body cues were the most impactful nodes in the complete network. The findings of our study provide a greater understanding of the IES-2 from the perspective of network analysis and have implications for applications of intuitive eating interventions for general populations.

The deflationary model of harm and moral wrongdoing: A rejoinder to Royzman & Borislow.

With a series of studies, Royzman and Borislow (2022) purport to show that extant models about the conditions under which harmful actions are deemed morally wrong do not have explanatory power-for any proposed condition, various harmful actions meet the condition but are not deemed immoral. And they reach the following conclusion: judgments of moral wrongdoing in the context of harmful actions (or judgments of moral wrongdoing more generally) are not reducible to an explanatory template. However, they did not address the main claim of the deflationary model of harm and moral wrongdoing, which is that intuitions of injustice connect harmful actions to judgments of moral wrongdoing (Sousa & Piazza, 2014). Our first study adjusts Royzman and Borislow' design to include a measure of perceived injustice, while our second elaborates their design to manipulate perceived injustice. The results undermine their conclusion and support the deflationary model, which we further refine here in light of the results of Royzman and Borislow's studies and ours.

Downstream network transformations dissociate neural activity from causal functional contributions.

Neuroscientists rely on distributed spatio-temporal patterns of neural activity to understand how neural units contribute to cognitive functions and behavior. However, the extent to which neural activity reliably indicates a unit's causal contribution to the behavior is not well understood. To address this issue, we provide a systematic multi-site perturbation framework that captures time-varying causal contributions of elements to a collectively produced outcome. Applying our framework to intuitive toy examples and artificial neural networks revealed that recorded activity patterns of neural elements may not be generally informative of their causal contribution due to activity transformations within a network. Overall, our findings emphasize the limitations of inferring causal mechanisms from neural activities and offer a rigorous lesioning framework for elucidating causal neural contributions.

Numerical simulation and investigation of soliton solutions and chaotic behavior to a stochastic nonlinear Schrödinger model with a random potential.

The stochastic nonlinear Schrödinger model (SNLSM) in (1+1)-dimension with random potential is examined in this paper. The analysis of the evolution of nonlinear dispersive waves in a totally disordered medium depends heavily on the model under investigation. This study has three main objectives. Firstly, for the SNLSM, derive stochastic precise solutions by using the modified Sardar sub-equation technique. This technique is efficient and intuitive for solving such models, as shown by the generated solutions, which can be described as trigonometric, hyperbolic, bright, single and dark. Secondly, for obtaining numerical solutions to the SNLSM, the algorithms described here offer an accurate and efficient technique. Lastly, investigate the phase plane analysis of the perturbed and unperturbed dynamical system and the time series analysis of the governing model. The results show that the numerical and analytical techniques can be extended to solve other nonlinear partial differential equations in physics and engineering. The results of this study have a significant impact on how well we comprehend how solitons behave in physical systems. Additionally, they may serve as a foundation for the development of improved numerical techniques for handling challenging nonlinear partial differential equations.

Object geometry serves humans' intuitive physics of stability.

How do humans judge physical stability? A prevalent account emphasizes the mental simulation of physical events implemented by an intuitive physics engine in the mind. Here we test the extent to which the perceptual features of object geometry are sufficient for supporting judgments of falling direction. In all experiments, adults and children judged the falling direction of a tilted object and, across experiments, objects differed in the geometric features (i.e., geometric centroid, object height, base size and/or aspect ratio) relevant to the judgment. Participants' performance was compared to computational models trained on geometric features, as well as a deep convolutional neural network (ResNet-50), none of which incorporated mental simulation. Adult and child participants' performance was well fit by models of object geometry, particularly the geometric centroid. ResNet-50 also provided a good account of human performance. Altogether, our findings suggest that object geometry may be sufficient for judging the falling direction of tilted objects, independent of mental simulation.

Children and adults' intuitions of what people can believe.

Two preregistered studies tested how 5- to 6-year-olds, 7- to 8-year-olds, and adults judged the possibility of holding alternative beliefs (N = 240, 110 females, U.S. sample, mixed ethnicities, data collected from September 2020 through October 2021). In Study 1, children and adults thought people could not hold different beliefs when their initial beliefs were supported by evidence (but judged they could without this evidential constraint). In Study 2, children and adults thought people could not hold different beliefs when their initial beliefs were moral beliefs (but judged they could without this moral constraint). Young children viewed moral beliefs as more constrained than adults. These results suggest that young children already have sophisticated intuitions of the possibility of holding various beliefs and how certain beliefs are constrained.

Lay Misperceptions of Culture as "Biological" and Suggestions for Reducing Them.

Culture is typically studied as socialized and learned. Yet lay intuitions may hold that culture is associated with biology via perceptions of race, presenting a problem for those who study culture: There may be a mismatch between how psychologists study culture and how their research is interpreted by lay audiences. This article is a call to researchers to recognize this mismatch as a problem and to critically evaluate the way we study culture. We first describe evidence that laypeople tend to associate culture with notions of folk biology. Next, we propose three suggestions for researchers: explicitly address whether biological processes are, or are not, relevant for studying culture in their work; consider using multiple methods because different methods for studying culture may come with assumptions about culture as more tied to socialization or biology; and represent all people as cultural by studying multiple forms of culture and by contextualizing all psychological research. Last, we provide an example for how researchers can implement these suggestions to encourage more accurate interpretations of findings.

Children dynamically update and extend the interface between number words and perceptual magnitudes.

As adults, we represent and think about number, space, and time in at least two ways: our intuitive-but imprecise-perceptual representations, and the slowly learned-but precise-number words. With development, these representational formats interface, allowing us to use precise number words to estimate imprecise perceptual experiences. We test two accounts of this developmental milestone. Either slowly learned associations are required for the interface to form, predicting that deviations from typical experiences (e.g., presentation of a novel unit or unpracticed dimension) will disrupt children's ability to map number words to their perceptual experiences or children's understanding of the logical similarity between number words and perceptual representations allows them to flexibly extend this interface to novel experiences (e.g., units and dimensions they have not yet learned how to formally measure). 5-11-year-olds completed verbal estimation and perceptual sensitivity tasks across three dimensions: Number, Length, and Area. For verbal estimation, they were given novel units (i.e., a three-dot unit called one "toma" for Number, a 44 px long line called one "blicket" for Length, a 111 px2 blob called one "modi" for Area) and asked to estimate how many tomas/blickets/modies they saw when shown a larger set of dots, lines, and blobs. Children could flexibly link number words to novel units across dimensions, demonstrating positive estimation slopes, even for Length and Area, which younger children had limited experience with. This suggests that the logic of structure mapping can be dynamically utilized across perceptual dimensions, even without extensive experience.

The development of modal intuitions: A test of two accounts.

Young children, unlike adults, deny that improbable events can happen. We test two accounts explaining this developmental shift. The development = reflection account posits that this shift is driven by an emerging ability to reflect on modal intuitions. In contrast, the development = intuition account posits that this shift is driven by changes in modal intuitions themselves, due to age-related changes in what people know and how they sample their knowledge and memories. These accounts make competing predictions about how long children and adults should take to make possibility judgments. In Experiment 1, we asked 123 children (39 5-year-olds, 42 7-year-olds, 42 9-year-olds; 49.60% White) and 40 adults (50% White) to judge the possibility of 78 ordinary, improbable, and impossible events and recorded their response times. In Experiment 2, we tested an additional 52 adults (42.32% White) who were under speeded conditions and thus less able to reflect before responding. Our results favor the development = intuition account. At all ages, people judged improbable events more slowly than ordinary or impossible events, and slow responding did not consistently predict affirmation over denial. Further, adults' possibility judgments did not change under speeded conditions. We also fit a drift-diffusion model to our data, which suggested that adults and children may sample different kinds of knowledge when generating intuitions. Our findings suggest that possibility judgments are often driven by modal intuitions with little reflection, and that a developmental shift in what children know and how knowledge is retrieved can explain why these intuitions change over time. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Tempering the tension between science and intuition.

Scientific ideas can be difficult to access if they contradict earlier-developed intuitive theories; counterintuitive scientific statements like "bubbles have weight" are verified more slowly and less accurately than closely-matched intuitive statements like "bricks have weight" (Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012). Here, we investigate how context and instruction influences this conflict. In Study 1, college undergraduates (n = 100) verified scientific statements interspersed with images intended to prime either a scientific interpretation of the statements or an intuitive one. Participants primed with scientific images verified counterintuitive statements more accurately, but no more quickly, than those primed with intuitive images. In Study 2, college undergraduates (n = 138) received instruction that affirmed the scientific aspects of the target domain and refuted common misconceptions. Instruction increased the accuracy of participants' responses to counterintuitive statements but not the speed of their responses. Collectively, these findings indicate that scientific interpretations of a domain can be prioritized over intuitive ones but the conflict between science and intuition cannot be eliminated altogether.

Infants expect friends, but not rivals, to be happy for each other when they succeed.

A friend telling you good news earns them a smile while witnessing a rival win an award may make you wrinkle your nose. Emotions arise not just from people's own circumstances, but also from the experiences of friends and rivals. Across three moderated, online looking time studies, we asked if human infants hold expectations about others' vicarious emotions and if they expect those emotions to be guided by social relationships. Ten- and 11-month-old infants (N = 154) expected an observer to be happy rather than sad when the observer watched a friend successfully jump over a wall; infants looked longer at the sad response compared to the happy response. In contrast, infants did not expect the observer to be happy when the friend failed, nor when a different, rival jumper succeeded; infants' looking times to the two emotion responses in these conditions were not reliably different. These results suggest that infants are able to integrate knowledge across social contexts to guide expectations about vicarious emotional responses. Here infants connected an understanding of agents' goals and their outcomes with knowledge of social relationships to infer an emotion response. Biased concern for friends but not adversaries is not just a descriptive feature of human relationships, but an expectation about the social world present from early in development. Further, the successful integration of these information types welcomes the possibility that infants can jointly reason about goals, emotions, and social relationships under an intuitive theory of psychology. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: 11-month-old infants use knowledge of relationships to make inferences about others' vicarious emotions. In Experiment 1 infants expected an observer to respond happily to a friend's success but not their failure. Experiments 2 and 3 varied the relationship between the observer and actor and found that infants' expectation of vicarious happiness is strongest for positive relationships and absent for negative relationships. The results may reflect an intuitive psychology in which infants expect friends to adopt concern for one another's goals and to thus experience one another's successes as rewarding.